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1. Introduction
1 
Recent  global  summits  and  international  conferences  underlined  the  salience  of  a 
“rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, as well as 
meaningful trade liberalization, which can substantially stimulate development worldwide, 
benefiting  countries  at  all  stages  of  development.”
2  This  has  provided  an  impetus  to 
development-oriented international trade and economic integration. In this context, the role of 
the  WTO is crucial  in helping  countries  integrate beneficially in  the  international  trading 
system.  In  the  current  phase  of  economic  globalization,  countries  are  indeed  trying  to 
participate in this global economic system to garner the benefits of deepening integration.
3  
The WTO has provided countries a forum in which to discuss and negotiate their terms 
of engagement in the multilateral trading system. Yet there are concerns among developing 
countries and newly acceded WTO members about the expected gains from multilateral trade. 
The fear of differential and asymmetric level of benefits across and within countries often 
makes  it  difficult  to  obtain  political  support  to  legitimise  an  across-the-board  trade 
liberalization agenda. In addition to this, countries engaged in the accession process need to 
put into place specific adjustment mechanisms.
 4  
As of 14 February 2008, 23 new members have acceded to the WTO, raising the total 
members to 151 (See Appendix Table A1), while the hope for the newly acceding member 
countries is to integrate their national trade into the multilateral trading system so as to gain 
through economic transactions and trade expansion.
 5 Furthermore, WTO membership is often 
seen as a means to gain credibility from the international business community; it is seen as 
indicating  the  willingness  of  acceding  countries  to  implement  far-reaching  changes  in 
domestic economic policies and institutions.
6   
                                                
1 See Basu, Ognivtsev and Shirotori (2008a) for a comprehensive discussion on WTO accession and its 
implications for acceding countries economic policies and trade-related institution building.    
2See UNCTAD (2005) 
3 Frankel (2001) reports that for new round, when dynamic effects are included, ‘might raise global income per 
capita by 2 percent over a twenty-five-year period, and four times than in the truly long run’.  
4See UNCTAD (2005) and  Bachetta and Jansen (2003) for discussions and evidence  on adjustment related 
economic costs.  
5Those are (in chronological order): Ecuador; Bulgaria; Mongolia; Panama; Kyrgyz Republic; Latvia; Estonia; 
Jordan; Georgia; Albania; Oman; Croatia;  Lithuania;  Moldova;  China;Taiwan, Province of China; Armenia; 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); Nepal; Cambodia; Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam and Kingdom 
of Tonga. In addition, the WTO General Council on 5 February 2008 paved the way for Ukraine’s membership 
by approving its accession terms. Ukraine will have to ratify the deal by 4 July 2008 and would become a WTO 
member 30 days after the ratification. Following the ratification of these terms, Ukraine will become 152
nd 
member of WTO.  See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm 
6North  (2003)  describes  institution  as  “the  process  of  change”,  and  helps  “improving  the  performance  of 
economies through time”. He emphasized that the key elements of institutions are to “have secure property 
rights” and “rule of law”.   - 4 -   
During the negotiation process, the newly acceded countries undertook a number of 
substantive  commitments  to  redesign  their  domestic  economic  structure  and  institutional 
framework,  as  well  as  to  make  economic  conditions  more  stable  and  predictable.  The 
accession process is often regarded as an unprecedented exercise in terms of the commitments 
that  link  aspects  of  domestic  economic  policies  and  institutional  matters.  In  particular, 
acceding countries have had to deliver tangible results to bring about changes in trade laws 
and regulations, providing improved market access in goods and services through reduction of 
import tariff duties and the liberalization of services sectors, making their trade regimes more 
transparent  for  business  communities.  As  noted  previously,  these  substantial  domestic 
economic policy changes were expected to send a credible signal to foreign investors to boost 
their confidence.
7 Nevertheless, little research has been carried out to date on the effects of 
WTO accession on domestic economic policies and institutions of newly acceded members.
8 
There are important, not to mention, controversial, studies to assess the impact of 
WTO membership on trade benefits enjoyed by countries and its role in providing critical 
impetus to economic activities.
9  The WTO as a rule-making multilateral world body ought to 
deliver meaningful benefits. However, given the differential level of economic development 
and domestic absorption capacity of many of acceding countries, the adjustment needs to be 
country specific to reduce unwanted costs arising during the process. Hence, the analysis of 
WTO accession should be broadened to include issues related to a broader economic policies 
and institutional structures and dimensions.
10  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  outlines  literature  related  to  WTO 
membership impact. The WTO accession process is described in Section 3. The channels 
through which WTO accession can impact economic policy and institutions are discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 documents data and empirical methodology for the analysis. Difference-
in-difference analysis is used to identify the performance of ‘treatment group’ (newly acceded 
WTO members) in relation to ‘control group’- the GATT/WTO developing countries in the 
sample. Section 6 shows initial results of 23 newly acceded WTO countries in terms of GDP 
                                                
7 Detken et al (2004) discussed the role of European Union (EU) to help increase economic and political stability 
in the newly acceding countries. It noted that there had been the overall positive achievements of newly 10 
acceded countries in terms of domestic policy reform and institutions. It strongly argued the role of the EU as an 
institutional anchor.   
8According  to  former  WTO  DG  M.Moore:  “One  important  way  in  which  countries  can  demonstate  their 
commitment to policy stability, predictability and good governance is through membership of WTO”. See WTO 
website for text of entire speech. 
9 See Piermartini and Teh (2005) for an overview of key CGE and Gravity modelling exercise results from 
Uruguay Round and Doha Round. 
10 See Acemoglu et al (2001), Rodrik et al (2004) for empirical evidence of the role of institutions in economic 
development.     - 5 -   
per capita, tariff rates and trade indicators, etc. Then specific results are shown by descriptive 
statistics  on  domestic  economic  policies  and  institutions,  and  explore  some  correlates  in 
Section  7.  The  next  section  presents  the  empirical  model  to  identify  the  role  of  WTO 
accession  on  domestic  economic  policies  and  institutions  by  employing  difference-in-
difference analysis. We also carry out robustness analysis. Section 9 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A Brief Literature Review 
This  section  briefly  points  to  some  research  papers  which  are  related  to  WTO 
accession and/or membership, and show how the role of WTO accession has been perceived 
to foster trade expansion and institution-building at the national level. An UNCTAD (2001) 
publication on “WTO Accessions and Development Policies” provides an integrated treatment 
of  different  aspects  of  WTO  accession  processes  and  country  specific  experiences.  The 
publication,  inter alia, discussed the importance  of WTO accession  to the newly acceded 
countries, and argued that “commitments made in the course of accession to WTO should not 
necessarily be deemed concessions. From this perspective, it might be more accurate (and 
politically palpable) to conceive them as investments, insofar as they are payments today in 
the expectation that they will produce rewards in the future”. Separately, in a series of thought 
provoking writings on GATT/WTO, Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 2003 and 2004) discussed 
the  design  and  implementation  of  international  trade  agreements,  and  reciprocity  and 
enforcement of government negotiation. Some of these theoretical underpinnings of WTO 
accession encouraged  more  empirical  discussions  on  the  impact  of  WTO  membership  on 
GDP, investment and trade.  
More importantly, recent studies have highlighted diverging opinions on the role and 
impact of WTO membership on trade outcomes. In a series of papers, Rose (2004, 2005 and 
2006) did not find any statistically significant results of WTO membership on bilateral trade 
flows. However, this  result  was  contested upon by  Subramanian and Wei (2003).
11 They 
argued  that  WTO  membership  could  affect  the  developed  and  developing  countries  in 
different ways, as well as across sectors. These studies decisively illustrate the fact that WTO 
accession  literature  is  primarily  concerned  in  assessing  the  trade-specific  effects  only  of 
acceding countries via membership. In fact, researchers have not yet given much attention to 
the analysis of WTO accession on domestic economic policies and institution-building. 
                                                
11Subramanian  and  Wei  (2003)  found  that  “WTO  (and  its  predecessor,  the  GATT)  had  promoted  world 
trade..[and that].... WTO may have increased world imports by about 44 percent or about US$3 trillion in 2000 
alone”.   - 6 -   
Let us briefly present four main studies which have included, to some extent, policy 
and institutional aspects of WTO accession. In one of the initial papers on the impact of WTO 
membership on transition countries, Drabek and Bacchetta (2004) related the impact of WTO 
accession  on  policymaking  and  institutional  reform.  They  found  that  for  newly  acceding 
countries, WTO membership brought significant improvement in governance and economic 
policies. They also documented several reasons why countries should join WTO, leading to 
beneficial  effects  on  domestic  policymaking  and  efficient  institutional  system.  In  another 
study, Kennett et al (2005) provided analytical discussions of the WTO accession of Bulgaria, 
Ecuador,  and  Jordan  and  also  highlighted  the  legal  obligations,  implications  and  trends 
associated with WTO accession. Ferrantino (2006) explored the effects of WTO accessions on 
governance. He compared the accession impact of North American FTAs on governance and 
concluded that the World Bank’s governance index indicators show no apparent relationship 
between the period of negotiation or engagement and improved governance”.
12  
Tang and Wei (2006) explored the consequences of WTO accession on income and 
investment. They found evidence that WTO accession led to income and investment spurs 
only  if  countries  had  gone  though  rigorous  accession  procedures.  They  also  showed  that 
“policy commitments associated with the accessions were helpful, especially for countries 
with poor governance”.
13 
The  papers  described  above  attempted  to  bring  out  the  policy  and  institutional 
component in the analysis of WTO accession outcomes. Yet the above studies did not discuss 
in totality the links between WTO accession and domestic policy and institution-building. In 
the spirit of the above discourse, this paper discusses the positive impact of the accession 
process  and  stringent  conditionalities  attached  to  WTO  membership.  The  countries  had 
actually  brought  about  substantial  domestic  economic  policy  reforms  to  overcome  many 
existing supply-side constraints and institutional bottlenecks.
14 Therefore, this paper aims to 
discuss only WTO accession and its impact on domestic economic polices and institutions of 
the  newly  acceded  WTO  members  in  comparison  to  rest  of  the  GATT/WTO  developing 
country members.  
 
 
                                                
12 In this paper, we do not include any of the six governance indicators from the World Bank’s “Governance 
Matters’ database. See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/ 
13 They used the World Bank’s governance index, and Regal Rights Index, along with Heritage Foundation’s 
Index of Economic Freedom. 
14 Basu (2008b) empirically finds a key role of institutions in raising development.   - 7 -   
3. WTO accession process: An overview 
This section briefly outlines the procedures necessary to become a member of WTO. 
The  benefits  of  joining  this  organization  are  as  follows:  “Membership  in  WTO  allows 
countries to design their development strategies and trade policies in a more predictable and 
stable trading environment. Accession to WTO must be seen not as an end in itself but as a 
key element in the pursuit of national development policy objectives; these objectives should 
be  clearly  defined  before  a  country  begins  the  accession  process,  so  that  the  terms  of 
accession, notably the specific concessions and commitments relating to foreign access to 
markets  for  goods  and  services,  as  well  as  other  commitments  under  WTO  Agreements 
(agricultural  and  industrial  subsidies,  trade  related  investment  policies  and  intellectual 
property rights, etc.), fall within the parameters of these policies.”(UNCTAD 2001) 
It has been discussed over the years that there is a need for appropriate balancing 
between domestic challenges and conforming to international trade rules during the process of 
negotiations so as to enhance their increasing and beneficial participation in the multilateral 
trading system. In view of the accession package, it is believed to foster the following changes 
in a country: “Accession, if it is to be achieved on balanced terms, should be recognized as a 
difficult and complicated process, which may be lengthy, requiring high-level preparations 
and coordination among government agencies and a broad political consensus in order to 
effectively pursue and defend national interests. It will also require tough negotiations with 
major WTO members. Such negotiations involve strategic and long-term issues which could 
affect  the  trade  and  development  policies  of  countries  concerned  for  years  to  come” 
(UNCTAD 2001).  
Figure 1 presents schematically the different broad steps to follow before becoming a 
WTO member. Article XII of WTO Agreement states that the conditions to become WTO 
members  as:  ‘accession  to  WTO  will  be  “on  terms  to  be  agreed”  between  the  acceding 
government and WTO. Accession to WTO is essentially a process of negotiation”.
15 The WTO 
accession  process  follows  the  general  rule  where  “each  accession  working  party  takes 
decisions  by  consensus,  all  interested  WTO  Members  must  be  in  agreement  that  their 
individual  concerns  have  been  met and  that outstanding issues have been resolved in the 




                                                
15See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm 
16 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm for detailed discussion.   - 8 -   
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Source: Adapted from UNCTAD and WTO accession documents 
 
Application for accession 
a communication to the Director-General of WTO 
[General Council] 
Consideration of the application and the establishment of a Working Party 
Examination of the terms of reference and appointment of the Chairperson 
[Multilateral track 
(Working Party)] 
Questions on the 
Memorandum from WTO 
members and Answers by 
the applicant.    
Examination of the foreign 
trade regime and its 
compatibility with WTO 
agreements, and specific 
terms of accession  
 
Drafting of the Report of 
the Working Party to the 
General 
Council/Ministerial 
Conference a draft 
decision and Protocol of 
Accession  
[Market access on goods track]  
negotiations on tariffs concessions, 
commitments on agricultural support 
and export subsidies  
 
   
The schedule of Concessions and 
Commitments on Goods 
[Market access on services track]  





The schedule of Concessions and 
Commitments on Services 
[General Council/ Ministerial Conference] 
Adoption of the Report of the Working Party and the approval of 
the draft. Decision (by a two-thirds majority of WTO Members' 
positive vote) 
 
Acceptance of the Protocol of Accession by the Applicant 
 
The Protocol enters into force and the applicant becomes a WTO 
member   - 9 -   
After this initial process, a working party is set up to initiate three interrelated tracks of 
accession negotiation: a systemic or multilateral track, a market access in goods track and a 
market  access  in  services  track.  During  the  accession  process,  countries  submit  detailed 
questions in the following areas: balance of payments; foreign exchange operations; statistics 
and  publication  systems  relating  to  foreign  trade;  customs  import  tariffs,  including  any 
preferential tariffs, customs fees, tariff exemptions, etc.; export regulations; import licensing; 
state  trading  enterprises;  pricing  practices  and  regulations;  taxation  systems;  subsidies  to 
specific  sectors  of  the  economy,  particularly  agriculture;  regime  for  foreign  investment; 
safeguard  measures  and  other  trade  remedies  (anti-dumping  and  countervailing  measures 
standardization and certification of imported goods); sanitary and phytosanitary standards; and 
systems of protection of intellectual property rights.
17 Once they have acceded, WTO members 
are expected to benefit from their participation in the multilateral trading system, which will 
translate into higher income, trade levels and better government and rule of law (italics added).
 
18 
Of the 151 members, 128 were contracting parties of the GATT system. The latter 
countries became “founder-members” of WTO when it was set up on 1 January 1995 after the 
signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement at Marrakesh in April 1994 (See Appendix Table 
A2  lists  founder  members  of  GATT/WTO  and  Table  A3  lists  countries  that  are  seeking 
accession to the WTO).
19 These 128 founder members did not need to accede to WTO under 
the Article XII.I of the Marrakesh Agreement.
20 
 
4. How does WTO accession process impact? 
 
This section provides the possible mechanisms through which WTO accession affects 
a country's policy and institutions. Membership in WTO requires that a country's trade regime 
conform to WTO rules.  The WTO rules consist of different components such as the General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  twelve  issue-specific  agreements  (e.g.  on 
                                                
17See UNCTAD (2001), and other WTO accession documents for further discussions. 
18 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b00_e.htm for further discussion. 
19 Another route to WTO membership is contained in GATT Article XXVI5(c) of GATT 1947 that notes that a 
territory of a contracting party that attains autonomy can be sponsored for membership by the contracting party. 
Eighteen countries became WTO members in 1994 thanks to this article, while Algeria and Cambodia had the 
possibility to exercise this clause, but they did not do so. The Article states “If any of the customs territories, in 
respect of which a contracting party has accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the 
conduct  of its external commercial relations and of the  other  matters provided for  in this Agreement, such 
territory  shall,  upon  sponsorship  through  a  declaration  by  the responsible contracting  party  establishing  the 
above-mentioned fact, be deemed to be a contracting party”  
See http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXVI. 
20 See Ognivtsev et al (UNCTAD, 2001) for a comprehensive discussion on accession issues.    - 10 -   
agriculture),  General Agreement on  Trade in  Services  (GATS) and Agreement on  Trade-
Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPs).  A  multilateral  working  party  is 
established to review each accession case; in these working parties WTO members investigate 
whether any part of the acceding country's trade regime is inconsistent vis-à-vis WTO rules.
21  
Two of the main areas under scrutiny are: economic policies measures affecting imports and 
exports, and the institutional framework (of legal and judicial factors) that exists to formulate 
and enforce such policies. Therefore, it is evident from accession requirements that one ought 
to look into the details of WTO accession for newly acceded members.   
 
4.1 Channels of WTO accession impact  
 
WTO accession impacts domestic economic policies and institutions through a variety 
of WTO rules, which directly correspond to those included under “policies affecting trade in 
goods and services” (See Table 1).  These specific economic policy measures in this package 
include regulations over imports and exports (e.g. tariff types, import licensing system, non-
tariff barriers, and export tax) as well as other “internal” measures that may affect trade, such 
as  industrial  and  agricultural  subsidies,  technical  standards,  and  state  trading  entities  as 
documented in the WTO accession technical note. 
22 If WTO members find that any economic 
policy measure is inconsistent with certain WTO provision(s), the acceding country needs to 
provide evidence when and how it intends to reform that specific economic policy in question, 
because these are all part of overall changes of the domestic economy. So, economic policy 
reforms and institutional changes declared in this manner by an acceding country are regarded 
as commitments on “rules”.   
Parallel to multilateral negotiations on rules, an acceding country negotiates bilaterally 
with interested WTO members over how many “concessions” it should make in terms of 
opening its market to exports from WTO members.  Concessions consist of tariffs that are to 
be  bound  at  “commercially  viable  levels”  (WTO  1995),  so  that  these  concessions  are 
incorporated  in  the  schedule  of  commitments  for  the  country  engaged  in  the  accession 
process.   
                                                
21 The largest Working Party so far is on the accession of the Russian Federation, to which 58 WTO members 
participate.  The smallest ones are for Bhutan and Montenegro, each with nine WTO members (WTO 2005, page 
8).   
22 See for further details, Technical Note on the Accession Process, WT/ACC/10/Rev.3, 2005, and 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm  
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Let us now discuss specifically the two main areas in which WTO accession affects 
economic  policies  and  institution-building.  As  there  is  no  WTO  Agreement  that  requires 
specific reform and change in many of the so-called institutional indicators, but the broad set 
of commitments can actually bring about real changes in not only economic policies but also 
on institutions of the acceding country.
23 
Once the accession negotiation is over, WTO members and acceding countries agree 
on  the  terms  of  accession  containing  commitments  on  rules  and  on  market  access 
negotiations; following this, a working party issues a report providing the details on the terms 
of accession. The Legislative Action Plans (LAPs) provides a clear indication of institutional 
changes, which contain a timetable for legislative changes, the intended policy reform, and the 
schedules of concessions in goods and services. It is worth noting here that these documents 
are legally binding under the protocol of accession, i.e. it cannot be altered unilaterally by the 
acceding country without prior consultations. All these clearly indicate a potential influence of 
WTO accession on the domestic economic policies and institutions of acceding countries. 
In the spirit of this paper, we examine the “width”, i.e. the areas,  of economic policy 
and institutional changes specified in the terms of accession of the 23 countries that have 
acceded to the WTO since 1995.  The width of economic policy changes is assessed in terms 
of the number of areas where a country stated its commitment on economic policy reform in 
its working party report. It is worth noting here that the spread of commitments made by each 
country  across  different  policy  areas  remain  very  similar  as  it  is  a  part  of  the  accession 
requirement.
24  
Across different policy areas, almost all countries made commitments in areas which 
have a direct correspondence to a WTO Agreement such as anti-dumping, customs valuation, 
import licensing measures, and TRIPs.  In such cases, commitments are a simple statement 
that a country will abide with the given WTO rule and worded in an almost identical manner 
across  countries,  this  is  probably  because  previous  working  party  reports  served  as  a 
precedent.  Then,  contents  of  the  commitments  often  include  specification  of  laws  to  be 
amended  or  created  in  order  to  be  consistent  and  ensuring  economic  policy  reform.  If 
                                                
23 Quite a number of recently accede countries made commitments with regard to privatization of stated-owned 
enterprises and pricing policies. Such commitments are referred to as “WTO-plus”, as they exceed the level of 
obligations that applies to existing WTO members. 
24 “Technical Note on Accession Process” (2005), prepared by the WTO secretariat, provides paragraphs which 
provide a type of commitments in the working party reports of each country.  Commitments according to this 
note take different forms, e.g. a specification of national measures to be amended in order to conform to WTO 
rules, acceptance of obligation to abide by existing WTO rules, or obligation not to have recourse to specific 
WTO provisions (e.g. transition periods).  The WTO secretariat note also indicates the number of paragraphs 
used to specify each commitment.    - 12 -   
countries have made no commitments in a specific policy area it generally means that they 
already  have  a  trade  regime  that  conforms  to  the  corresponding  WTO  rules.  In  case  of 
developing countries and particularly LDCs, it could be due to the fact that the special and 
differential (S&D) provision of a given WTO rule allows them to be exempted from abiding 
with this rule, although there are cases that the S&D provisions are not automatically granted 
to newly acceding countries including LDCs.
25     
In Table 1, we schematically present the two areas a working party focuses on during 
the WTO accession process and the impacts that WTO membership would have on domestic 
economic and institution-building.  
In  this  paper  we  argue  that accession  commitments  and  stringent  conditionalities  for 
making  changes  in  domestic  economic  policies  and  institutional  framework  help  aspiring 
countries to implement and deepen their transformation for qualitative changes over time. These 
multilateral commitments oblige them to become more credible, notably by implementing an 
appropriate  set  of  economic  policies  within  a  specific  period  of  time.  The  time-bound 
commitments  help  to  generate  a  huge  amount  of  domestic  pressures  in  place  of  a  WTO 
consistent set of policies to initiate domestic economic policy reform measures.   
In other words, Table 1 shows that the WTO accession process does not limit itself to 
trade  policy  measures  and/or  external  sector  liberalization.  The  accession  package  deal 
envisages  that  concerned  governments  will  undertake  substantial  reform  at  the  domestic 
economy policy level that may help to reduce constraints, both on the economic and institutional 
fronts. Given this perspective, we argue that a single measure to identify WTO accession impact 
on a country may not be fully appropriate, and one ought to look for a composite measure of 
economic policies and institutions. 
More  specifically,  by looking at the above  Table 1, we  observe that the institutional 
dimensions consists of the following aspects: structure and powers of government and of the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches; administration of policies on WTO-related issues, 
authority of sub-central governments, uniform administration of trade regime, judicial review, 
publication of information on trade and trade laws, and submitting WTO notifications. Rules 
related to WTO accession can clearly help stimulate tangible changes in institutions, in the case 
of economic policy measures, which are directly related to import and export regulations and 
policies, and  
                                                
25 Note that in some policy areas such as agriculture, making no commitment is a declaration that a country 
follows WTO rule. For instance, in the agricultural policies, no commitment in terms of reduction of agricultural 
subsidies means that a country is committed not to have any such subsidies to begin with.   - 13 -   
Table 1: Impacts of WTO accession process on economic policies and institutions  
 
Source: Technical Note on the Accession Process, WT/ACC/10/Rev.3, 2005, and 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm . See also Basu, Ognivtsev, and Shirotori (2008a)   
 
  Commitments in specific policy areas 
Import regulations  Import regimes, customs code, ordinary customs duty, other 
duties  and  charges,  TRQ,  tariff  exemptions,  application  of 
internal  taxes  on  imports,  prohibitions,  quotas,  restrictive 
licences,  import  licensing  procedures,  customs  valuation, 
rules  of  origin,  other  customs  formalities,  pre-shipment 
inspection,  contingency  measures  (e.g.  anti-dumping, 
countervailing or  and safeguard measures). 
Export regulations  Tariffs  or  taxes  on  exports,  export  restrictions,  export 
subsidies, export processing zones. 
Trade  in 
goods 
Internal  policies 
affecting  trade  in 
goods 
Taxes  and  charges  levied  on  imports,  industrial  policies 
including  subsidies,  technical  barriers  to  trade  (TBT)  and 
sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  (SPS),  trade-linked 
investment  measures  (TRIMs),  state  trading  entities,  free 
zones and special economic areas, government procurement, 
transit,  agricultural  policies,  trade  in  civil  aircraft,  textiles, 
and trading rights (e.g. advertising and trade in alcohol and 
tobacco).  
Trade in services  Horizontal  commitments  (in  Modes  1,  2,  3,  4),  MFN 
exemption,  full  or  partial  commitments  in  the  following 
services - business, communication, construction, distribution, 
educational,  environmental,  financial,  health,  tourism  and 
travel-related, transport.  
Policies 
affecting  trade 
in  goods  And 
services 
Trade-Related  Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Obligations stipulated in the TRIPS Agreement. 
Other related policies   Non discrimination, foreign exchange and payments, balance 
of payment measures, investment regime, state ownership and 
privatization, and pricing policies. 
Policies affecting institutions  Structure  and  powers  of  government;  powers,  executive, 
legislative and judiciary administration of policies on WTO-
related issues; authority of sub-central governments; uniform 
administration of trade regime; judicial review (including the 
right of appeal).    - 14 -   
TRIPs issues, etc. Hence, we argue in favour of using a composite measure of economic policy 
and institutions in this paper.   
Therefore, the purpose here is to explain and provide empirical evidence for the fact that 
due to WTO membership requirements, there have been substantial changes in economic policy 
and  institution-building  after  controlling  for  the  developing  country  members  of  the 
GATT/WTO.  
                   
 
4.2 A testable hypothesis 
 
The analysis is based on the WTO accession cases in 1995-2007. The findings suggest 
that  WTO  accession  can  induce,  under  certain  conditions,  countries  to  establish  or  improve 
domestic  policies  and  institution-building.    However,  the  accession  process  itself  needs  to 
incorporate mechanisms which take account of the differing levels of economic development and 
institutional  capacity  of  acceding  countries,  so  as  to  avoid  placing  a  heavier  burden  of 
implementation  policy  and  institutional  reform  and  related  costs  on  countries  with  limited 
human, administrative and financial resources. Given this backdrop, we intend to put forward the 
following testable hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis: The WTO accession process has mainly a positive and significant impact on 
domestic  economic  policy  and  institution-building.  Countries  that  have  become  WTO 
members show higher level of institutional improvements in relation to other developing 
country members of the GATT/WTO.  
 
 The principal logic of this hypothesis, as described above, is that during the WTO 
negotiation process an aspiring country has to undertake far-reaching commitments that are 
directly related to domestic economic policy reforms and institutions; these commitments are 
related  to  systemic  changes  of  economic  measures  and  relevant  policy  changes  for 
institutional capacity-building that go deeper than other one-time changes in policymaking. 
We  show  that  compared  to  developing  country  (members  of  WTO),  the  newly  acceded 
members have benefited because of a stringent negotiation process, during which the WTO 
played the role of an ‘external’ policy anchor to help bring about domestic economic policy 
and institutional changes.  
Therefore,  the  aim  is  to  present  empirical  evidence  and  support  to  the  fact  when 
analysing the effect of WTO accession, we need to go beyond the usual measures of trade   - 15 -   
flows  or  trade  policy,  and  rather  a  broad  composite  measure  of  economic  policies  and 
institutions should  be considered  to understand WTO accession impacts. To that end,  we 
specifically argue that the composite measures should be included as outcome variables in the 
empirical modelling section of the paper, and then use the rest of the developing country 
GATT/WTO members as a reference group to determine the effects on the domestic economic 
policies and institutions of newly acceded WTO members. 
The majority of the studies examined during this research have emphasized the direct 
impact  of  the  GATT/WTO  membership  on  trade  policy  measures  and  trade  outcomes  in 
general. Some papers attempted to relate to this policy and institution-building. However, we 
show that rather than taking an indirect route econometric modelling can be used to identify 
the channels through which WTO accession helps countries to promote a substantial policy 
reform agenda. In other words, the focus should be placed on examining the impacts of WTO 
accession  impacts  on  domestic  economic  policy  and  institutional  changes  in  a  concrete 
manner. Policymaking and improvement in institutional quality should prepare countries to 
climb further up the development ladder. Once we figure out this untapped linkage, then the 
question of accession impact can be explored rigorously on trade, investment, finance and 
development.    
 
5.  Data and empirical model 
In  this  section,  we  set  up  and  examine  through  econometric  specification  of  the 
hypothesis  that  accession  has  a  positive and  significant  impact  on  economic  policies  and 
institutions (DEI). In other words, if accession to the WTO influences policies and institutions 
in the acceding country, what is the extent of this influence?   
In order to capture the changes in DEI two measures for the dependent variable are 
used - one for the baseline estimation and another for checking of the model's robustness. The 
measure for the baseline estimation is the Index of Economic Freedom (EFI) estimated by the 
Heritage Foundation. The EFI is a composite measure constructed from ten indicators - trade, 
fiscal  burden,  monetary  policy,  foreign  investment,  banking,  wages  and  prices,  property 
rights,  regulation,  and  international  market.    The  data  are  estimated  for  101  developing 
countries  during  the  period  1995-2004.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  EFI  has  not  been 
constructed to take into account the accession impacts on domestic economic and institutional 
quality. However, the  constituents of  the  index  can capture some of aspects of accession 
commitments. (See Appendix Table A4 for detailed discussions of the EFI and components).   - 16 -   
The second measure (for robustness analysis) of the dependent variable is obtained 
from PRS group data on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that helps to identify 
the  risk  measure  of  business  investment  by  companies.
26  The  PRS  Group  has  provided 
‘perception-based’ data and information on a number of risk components on a monthly basis 
since 1984; this data helps to identify policy and institutional related developments in more 
than 130 countries. We included three components from their dataset, which are related to 
countries economic policies and institutions, such as investment profile (IP), law and order 
(LO), and bureaucracy quality (BQ). The data are used since 1995 to 2004 for 81 developing 
countries, including GATT/WTO members (See Appendix Table A5 for detailed discussions 
of the ICRG index and its components).  Therefore, in this paper, we use two measures of 
DEI, (i.e. EFI or ICRG) to identify the impact of WTO accession negotiation during the 
treatment period.   
The key independent variable in this paper is the WTO accession dummy variable. 
This is computed from the information on member countries of WTO documents which are 
downloadable from WTO website directly.
27 The control variable in all of the specifications is 
lagged  GDP  per  capita  (log  of),  which  is  obtained  from  the  World  Bank’s  World 
Development Indicators (2006). (See Appendix Table A6 for list of countries in the sample).  
The test uses the tool of difference-in-difference (DD) analysis which uses dummy 
variables to segment the observations for countries and years in order to produce estimates of 
the effects of WTO accession on DEI.
28 The hypothesis is accepted if the countries that went 
through  the  accession  process  show  higher  levels  of  improvements  in  DEI  than  other 
developing-country members of the GATT/WTO.
29  Twenty-one newly acceded countries are 
defined  as  the  ‘treatment  group’  and  other  developing  countries  which  are  GATT/WTO 
members as the ‘control group’ (See Appendix Table A6 for the list of countries in the sample 




                                                
26 In PRS Group website, they claim that “You can trust the PRS Group to bring you the accurate and timely 
information you need to make the decisions that are crucial to your business” (http://www.prsgroup.com/) 
27 See http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm for relevant country-wise accession documents. 
28 See  Meyer (1995), Slaughter (2001) and  Betrand et al (2004) for a detailed discussion on  difference-in-
difference analysis. 
29 Information on Viet Nam and Tonga are not included in the analysis because of their recent entry to the WTO. 
We don’t have enough information to test impact on their domestic economic policies and institutions buildings.  
30 The selection of sample country depends on the availability of comparable data across variables for all the 
model specifications.     - 17 -   
Let us define the following notations as follows below: 
it DEI  is the measure (EFI or ICRG) of domestic economic policy and institutional quality of 
country i at time period t.  
{ } 1 , 0 Î it WTOd =Dummy variable of whether a country i is member of WTO (=1) or not (=0) 
at time point tin the sample.  
1
* t it DEI + D =Measures  (EFI  or  ICRG)  the  change  in  the  domestic  economic  policy  and 
institutions  over  the  treatment  period  for  the  treatment  group,  the  newly  acceded  WTO 
members. 
0
* t it DEI + D =Measures  (EFI  or  ICRG)  the  change  in  the  domestic  economic  policy  and 
institutions over the treatment period for the control group.  
  Therefore, the causal effect of WTO accession negotiation for country i at time point 
tand  * t t +  is compared for the outcome of the change in the domestic economic policy and 
institutions (EFI or ICRG) over the treatment period for the treatment group in comparison to 
the control group.   
Let us write now the average treatments effects (ATE) on the treated in the following form: 
{ } { } 0 | 1 | *
0
*
1 = D - = D = + + it t t it t t WTOd DEI E WTOd DEI E ATE ……. (1) 
In  equation  (1),  { } 1 | *
1 = D + it t t WTOd DEI E   measures  (EFI  or  ICRG)  the  change  in  the 
domestic economic policy and institutions in a country  iof newly acceded WTO members, 
while  { } 0 | *
0 = D + it t t WTOd DEI E  measures the change in the same in a country i for control 
group in the respective samples.  
  By following equation (1), to explore Hypothesis, the difference-in-difference analysis 
is employed here by estimating the following equation: 
it
TG




t it it i it






0 * 1 0








it is the measure (EFI or ICRG) for country i belonging to the treatment group 
of twenty-one recently acceded countries.  i a captures fixed effects of country i.  
WTOdit is a dummy variable for country i which is equal to 1 if a country is a member of the 
WTO at time t and to 0 if it is not.   0 b  thus captures the effect of WTO accession in the year   - 18 -   
after accession and  1 b the effect of WTO accession in subsequent years for the whole sample 




it is a dummy variable for country i in the treatment group (the newly acceded 
countries) which is equal to 1 in the year of accession and 0 otherwise. WTOd
TG=1
it+t* is a 
dummy variable for the same country i which is equal to 0 in years prior to WTO accession 
and to 1 in the year of WTO accession and subsequent years.  0 d thus captures the additional 
effect  of  WTO  accession  in  the  year  of  accession  and  1 d   the  additional  effect  of  WTO 
accession in subsequent years for the treatment group in comparison to the control group. 
 
Xit-1 is the log of lagged GDP per capita which acts as a proxy to capture all other country-
specific variations.  t l  represents the time-specific effects in the model specification, and e is 
an  error  term  which  is  assumed  to  have  zero  mean  and  constant  variance  and  not  to  be 
autocorrelated. 
 
However, if we only consider newly acceded WTO member countries in the sample, then 
equation (2) boils down to the following: 
it t it t it it i it X WTOd WTOd DEI e l f d d a + + + + + = - + 1 * 1 0 ……(3) 
where  it DEI  is the measure (EFI or ICRG) of domestic economic policy and institutional 
quality of country i at time period t,  0 d captures the contemporaneous change in the outcome 
variable with WTO accession, and while  1 d  captures the change in outcome variable with 
after effects of WTO accession. The results are discussed in section 6.  
   
6. WTO accession: Some stylized facts 
  WTO member countries  have  carry  out many policy  changes  during  the accession 
process. Evidence of some of the changes that the 23 newly acceded countries is documented 
below  (Appendix  Table  A7  lists  these  23  countries).  These  countries  implemented  these 
changes as they wished to enjoy the benefits of a multilateral trading system, and become 
eligible for MFN treatment on all their economic transactions from other member countries. 
The  statistics  show  that  population  size  of  these  countries  is  relatively  small,  except  for 
ChinaThe  GDP  per  capita  (current  $)  varies  across  countries,  with  $270.7  in  Nepal,  and   - 19 -   
$15,291 in Taiwan, Province of China in 2005. The Trade/GDP ratio for Nepal, for example, 
is less than 50 per cent, while that of Estonia is almost 165 per cent. These numbers only 
show that countries vary not only in their economic development, but also in so-called trade 
openness measure.
31 
Newly acceded countries reduced their applied MFN tariff rates following their first 
working  party  meeting  (See  Table  A8).
32    In  the  base  year  (i.e.  1995),  13  countries  had 
average tariff rates of more than 10 per cent, but in the latest year (2005) for which data are 
available only seven countries still had these average tariff rates.  The maximum average tariff 
rate in the base year was 35.5 per cent (China), but only 16.8 per cent (Viet Nam) in the latest 
year.  A quick look at the table indicates that China’s tariff rates decline has been substantial, 
and followed by Albania and Jordan.  
  The level of participation in international trade for each country is depicted by its 
share of global merchandise trade.  Only China has shown a significant rise of its share from 
2.88 per cent in 1995 to 7.28 per cent in 2005. The export and import share (merchandise 
products) of the 23 new member countries in 1995 and 2005 are also key to understanding 
their increased participation in international trade after acceding to the WTO.
33 (See Appendix 
Table A9)  Other countries show an overall slow rise in their share over the period; however 
the difference is not statistically significant in comparison to the base year of observation. It 
can be argued that the impact of WTO accession would probably be realised after some years 
of membership.   
  The descriptive statistics of above indicators for two separate years (see Appendix 
Table A10) show that average per capita GDP is characterized by a significant amount of 
dispersion among countries, and that the trade/GDP ratio had increased; however, MFN tariff 
rates  had  declined  significantly  over  the  period.  The  share  of  merchandise  exports  as  a 
percentage of world exports increased from 0.32 to 0.51 per cent over the past decade, as did 
imports. Therefore, it provides some initial association indicating the fact that countries with 
falling tariff rates are doing more trade.  
Another crucial element of the accession process is the statistics related to number of 
“systemic” (or institutional) commitments made by these countries in the working party report 
                                                
31 See Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003) for a discussion on trade openness measure.  
32 We perform paired mean difference test of two periods across 22 countries. The result is statistically 
significant at 1 per cent level, indicating there has been a significant fall in latest year compared to base tariff 
rates.  
33Merchandise exports and imports and trade/GDP data are obtained from UNCTAD’s Handbook of Statistics 
(2008).   - 20 -   
(Appendix Table A11). The width of the terms of accession refers to the range of issues in 
which acceding countries are required to reform their economic policies and institutions. On 
average, countries made commitments in 23 policy areas. By taking statistics from acceding 
countries, we find that the mean number of “areas of commitments” is 23 (excluding China 
and Taiwan, Province of China is 22).  Under each policy area, however, some acceding 
countries have made  much "deeper" commitments  than  others. The depth of the  terms  of 
accession is assessed by the number of commitment paragraphs in the working party report, 
since these paragraphs refer to the types and the degree of policy and institutional reforms that 
acceding countries have to undertake. The average number of “paragraphs of commitments” 
was  34:  Mongolia  negotiated  the  smallest  number  of  paragraphs  of  commitments  (17); 
whereas  China  took  the  maximum  number  of  paragraphs  of  commitments  (82).  Another 
interesting statistic is the number of working party meetings that were held and members 
present during the accession process. Nepal and Georgia had only 3 meetings each during 
their accession process, whereas China had 41 meetings with working party members. The 
number of working party members is another indication of how existing member countries are 
interested in the economic strength and future prospects of the candidate country. A quick 
look at the table shows that mean number of members is 28 (excluding China and Taiwan, 
Province of China where the number stood at 24). China had 62 working party members, 
while Cambodia and the Kyrgyz Republic each had 15 working party members.  
 
The  key  accession  information  discussed  above  clearly  indicates  that  acceding 
countries  have  made  substantial  commitments.  Subsequent  sections  will  seek  to 
systematically explore the implications of WTO accession on domestic economic policies and 
institution-building. 
 
7. Linking WTO accession to economic policies and institutions  
In  this  section,  we  describe  briefly  the  descriptive  statistics  of  EFI;  and  ICRG 
measures  to  indicate  the  economic  policy  changes  and  institutional  quality  for  acceding 
countries. We present results for 21 countries that have completed the accession procedures as 
Viet Nam and Tonga were not taken into account in the empirical analysis.  
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7.1 Some descriptive results  
The  key  question  is  to  determine  any  domestic  economic  policy  and  institutional 
changes  among  newly  acceded countries  during  this  period  on.  First, we  discuss  the  EFI 
measure, and then the ICRGI, and then analyse three groups of countries for both the samples 
in enlarged version. By dividing countries into the following groups: Developing countries 
GATT members only, WTO members and WTO members-Article XXVI5(c).  
We present the results for the EFI sample (See Appendix Table A12). This sample 
consists of a total 98 countries. The developing country GATT members have an EFI value of 
1.73  and  1.85  for  the  newly  acceded  WTO  members.  Moreover,  WTO  members-Article 
XXVI5(c) registered average value of 1.71. The above figure clearly shows that the value is 
highest for the newly acceded members, and the maximum value (3.32 of Estonia) in the 
sample is from this group. Similarly, we present the results from the ICRG sample. It consists 
of 80 developing countries GATT/WTO members. The WTO members’ average stands at 
4.90, 4.57 for GATT members and 3.908 for XXVI5(c) countries (See Appendix Table A13). 
The  average of  all the developing countries in the sample is  3.92. The above descriptive 
statistics provide an initial indication that in our sample for both sets of measures, newly 
acceded  WTO  member  countries  have  performed  better  that  the  rest  of  the  groups.  This 
preliminary  finding  implies  that  domestic  economic  policy  and  institutional  changes  have 
been raised substantially over the period for newly acceded members of WTO as compared to 
the rest. 
  
7.2 Some correlates  
Firstly, we determine correlation among EFI and ICRGI components. Secondly, the 
correlation results between GDP per capita (log of) with a composite measure, such as EFI 
and  ICRGI,  and  its  constituent  components  are  presented.  The  correlation  matrix  of  10 
components of EFI is also reported (Appendix Table A14). By looking closely at the table, 
one can observe some interesting relationships among the components. For example, the trade 
(TD) policy component is significantly correlated with foreign investment (FI) and banking 
(BK) component measures of EFI. TD is not statistically significantly correlated with only 
monetary policy (MP) component also. Similarly, the property rights (PR) component has 
highest correlations with the foreign investment (FI), banking (BK), and wages and prices 
(WP)  components,  and  has  least  correlation  with  the  monetary  policy  (MP)  component. 
Furthermore,  the  regulation  (RE)  component  of  EFI  shows  a  maximum  correlation  with   - 22 -   
property rights (PR) component and followed by the foreign investment (FI), banking (BK), 
and wages and prices (WP) component.  
The correlation of foreign investment (FI) with banking (BK) is highest, and followed 
by  the  wage  and  prices  (WP),  property  rights  (PR)  and  regulation  (RE)  components.  It 
indicates that institutional measures are important elements of economic policy change, and 
its improvements. The domestic economic policy change and institutional measure are all 
positively related to each other in the EFI sample. Let us now turn to discuss the relationship 
of these the EFI components with GDP per capita (Appendix Table A15). The composite 
measure of 10 components is the economic freedom index (EFI), and that is highly correlated 
with GDP per capita (log of) indicator, 0.65. 
By analysing individual components of EFI, we observe that better regulation (RE) is 
highly correlated with GDP per capita, and so is the property rights (PR) component, and 
improvements  in  the  (in)  formal  market  (IM)  component.  Monetary  policy  (MP)  and 
government intervention (GI) components have the least correlations with GDP per capita 
component. It again shows that improved banking (BK) and foreign investment (FI) have 
statistically significant positive correlation with the GDP per capita; this is equally true for the 
trade (TD) component. With all of these domestic policy and institutional measures, it comes 
out strongly that GDP per capita measure is positively correlated.    
The  International  Country  Risk  Guide  Index  (ICRGI)  is  composed  of  three 
components: investment profile (IP); law and order (LO); and bureaucratic quality (BQ). The 
Investment profile (IP) component of ICRGI is found to be positively correlated (statistically 
significant)  with  the  law  and  order  (LO)  and  bureaucratic  quality  (BQ)  components. 
Bureaucratic quality (BQ) has the highest correlation with the law and order (LO) component. 
The correlations between GDP per capita with three components are shown in the next table 
(Appendix  Table  A17);  the  results clearly  indicate  that  bureaucratic  quality  (BQ)  has  the 
highest correlation with GDP per capita, followed by law and order (LO) and investment 
profile (IP). (Appendix Table A16).   
Therefore,  a  high  correlation  between  domestic  economic  policy  components  (i.e. 
banking, wages and prices, trade, fiscal burden, foreign investment, investment profile) with 
institutional measures (i.e. property rights, regulation, law and order, and bureaucratic quality) 
should not  be interpreted as causation. The preliminary results  of  interrelationship among 
these components with GDP per capita are also encouraging. This helps us to explore in detail 
the causal relation through econometric modelling in later sections of this paper.    - 23 -   
8. Empirical Results 
  To provide empirical support to testable hypotheses, this section intends to discuss 
results  from  difference-in-difference  analysis.  The  results  from  the  three  estimation 
procedures: ordinary least squares (OLS), feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and fixed 
effects (FE) are presented. These model specifications are run with the economic freedom 
index as dependent variables. For robustness analysis, we use international country risk guide 
(ICRG) index as well. Another set of set of robustness analysis was carried out by dropping 
China  and  Saudi  Arabia  from  the  sample.
34  These  two  countries  were  removed  from  the 
sample for two very specific reasons: (i) the total time from application to membership was 
among  the  highest  for  these  countries;  and  (ii) they  had  to  make  a  maximum  number  of 
commitments during the accession negotiations. Previously, it was argued that the number of 
commitments  was  related  to  changes  in  economic  policies  and  institutions.  These  two 
countries may, therefore bias the results downward.  
 
8.1 Main results 
   
The estimation results of equation 2 (see Section 5) are shown in Appendix Table A18, 
A19 and A20. Results are obtained by considering all developing countries in the sample as 
control group. First, OLS (pooled) results for economic freedom index (EFI) as dependent 
variable are presented. (Appendix Table A18) The main independent variable is the WTO 
accession dummy, and lagged GDP per capita (log of) is the control variable. In the first three 
columns (Col.1 to Col. 3), we define the WTO accession year as a dummy variable, where 
accession year is 1 and it remains 1 for the rest of the sample time points, and zero otherwise. 
The first column  show statistically  significant  positive coefficients  of the WTO  accession 
dummy  variable  (coefficient  is  0.138  and  significant  at  10  per  cent  level).  The  control 
variable,  lagged  GDP  per  capita  (log  of),  is  positive  and  significant  in  all  the  different 
specifications of the model. In column 2, We included a time trend variable {timetrend1995=1, 
timetrend1996=2,…..)  to  account  for  the  overall  trend  in  economic  freedom  index,  i.e.,  to 
understand if there has been any perceptible secular positive trend in economic policy and 
institutions for these sets of countries in the sample. The positive and significant coefficient 
on  the  time  trend  indicates  that  the long-run  trend  in  WTO accession to  domestic  policy 
changes and institutions are upward. In the regression estimation in Column 3, we include 
both year effects and time trend, but in that case the coefficient is no longer significant at the 
                                                
34 Saudi Arabia do not matter much as after their accessions, there is no data point in the sample.    - 24 -   
10 per cent level. This result can follow from the fact that in simple pooled OLS, by ignoring 
the country heterogeneity, the year effects may have actually accounted for changes in EFI. 
We now show an analytical exercise of WTO accession impact at the domestic level. 
We  postulate  that  WTO  accession  could  impact  on  economic  policy  and  institutions  to  a 
country which did not go through the accession process (a control country). If OLS is a causal 
relationship, then the size of the coefficient on WTO accession dummy suggests its impact on 
economic policy and institutions, which is measured by EFI. For example, Madagascar did 
not go through with WTO accession process, while Lithuania had gone through the process. 
The  regression  coefficient  from  column  1  of  Appendix  Table  A18  indicates  that  if 
Madagascar had gone through the WTO accession process as in Lithuania, then Madagascar 
would raise EFI to 1.77, closing the gap with Lithuania from an average of 0.64 to 0.54 
points, which is a substantial improvement. Madagascar’s EFI would then become higher than 
that of developing countries of GATT/WTO average of 1.73.
35 This simple exercise shows a 
substantial improvements that could occur had other been gone through the accession process.  
In  the  remaining  columns  (Columns  4  to  6),  we  attempt  to  understand  the  WTO 
accession impact on economic policy and institutional measures, by isolating the accession 
time profile into the two indicators to ascertain the impact: the year of accession to WTO, and 
for  the  subsequent  years.  (Appendix  Table  A18).  The  economic  policy  and  institutional 
measures is due to its lengthy process and that changes are slow, and that governments need 
to  pursue  such  measures  on  a  longer-term  basis.  The  positive  reflections  on  economic 
outcome  measures  are  not  necessarily  supposed  to  occur  only  in  the  first  year  after  the 
accession; rather results turn out to be substantially improved during subsequent time period. 
We can expect that WTO (t0+t*) to be positive always, if not WTO (t0).
36  It is observed that 
both  WTO  (t0)  and  WTO  (t0+t*)  are  positively  significant  in  all  the  different  model 
specifications; WTO (t0+t*) is statistically more significant.
37 Hence, the coefficients of the 
WTO accession dummy designed to estimate the additional effects on DEI for newly acceded 
countries  over  a  longer  period  than  simply  the  year  of  accession  are  positive  and  highly 
statistically significant, as are the coefficients for the proxy variable, (log of) real GDP per 
capita. The conclusion as to the significance of the influence of WTO accession over a longer 
period is therefore valid.  
                                                
35 The EFI average over the period for Lithuania is 2.27, and 1.63 for Madagascar.  
36 WTO (t0) = 1 for the year of accession, 0 for the rest of sample period. WTO (t0+t*) = 1 for the years after 
WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of sample period.  
37 The common intercepts hypothesis is rejected in all the model specification as shown by F-statistics. It is note 
worthy that throughout this paper, robust standard errors and adjusted for clustering by country are reported.   - 25 -   
The Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator is employed because it is consistent 
and asymptotically more efficient than OLS (Wooldridge, 2003).
38 The GLS estimators are 
used to account for heteroskedasticity in the error terme .
39 We use FGLS estimation in the 
presence of panel specific AR (1) autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity across panels with 
no cross-sectional correlation.
40 We present feasible GLS (FGLS) results. (Appendix Table 
A19)  The  overall  model  specifications  remain  similar  to  that  with  previous  findings. 
(Appendix Table A18). So, all coefficients of interest remain positive and highly significant. 
However, after considering the panel-specific autocorrelation process, results show that the 
size of standard errors has been drastically reduced without changing its sign and level of 
significance either. 
We can illustrate the estimation results on the basis of Fixed Effects (FE) estimates, 
which,  of  the  three  regression  techniques  (OLS,  GLS  and  FE)  deployed,  is  intended  to 
eliminate distortions of the parameters from the largest number of possible sources. The FE 
estimator to capture the unobserved country-specific variation in a fixed effects intercept in 
the model specification. Also, the fixed effects capture the average cross-sectional effect over 
time to account for shifts over time the countries relative position to each other countries in 
the  sample.  The  fixed  effects  results  of  the  equation  2  (Section  3)  are  presented  in  the 
following table (Appendix Table A20).  The first three columns (Col.1 to Col.3) again show 
that the WTO accession coefficient is positive and significant in all the specifications. The 
coefficient on time trend is positive and significant, which implies there has been upward 
movement  in  EFI,  so  it  captures  overall  improvement  of  these  treatment  group  countries 
(newly acceding countries) have shown an overall positive upward trend in their domestic 
economic policies and institutions. Column 3 shows results by including time specific effects, 
along  with  time trend, as in column 6  of the same table. The results still  remains highly 
significant  for  WTO  (t0+t*)  variable  for  columns  5  to  columns  6.  But,  the  WTO  (t0) 





                                                
38 Wooldridge further notes that “at any rate, for large sample sizes, FGLS is an attractive alternative to OLS 
when there is evidence of heteroskedasticity that inflates the standard errors of the OLS estimates”. 
39 See Hausman and Kuersteiner (2004) on the comparison between feasible GLS and OLS procedures. They 
note that “corrected FGLS based tests outperforms tests based on OLS”  
40 See Bertrand et al (2004) for further dissuasion on the importance to “correct the standard errors assuming that 
the error term follows an AR(1) process”.    - 26 -   
8.2: Robustness analysis  
 
We now further check robustness of our hypotheses by including international country 
risk guide index (ICRGI) as the dependent variable. This index is a simple average of three 
components: investment profile; law and order; and bureaucratic quality. The result of this 
analysis  is reported  (Appendix Tables  A21, A22 and A23).  As expected, for three  model 
specifications (OLS, FGLS, and FE), the WTO accession coefficient is positive and highly 
significant.  
To carry out another robustness analysis, we report results excluding China and Saudi 
Arabia from the sample (Appendix Table A24). This also shows by dropping these countries, 
from sample EFI and ICRGI, has shown substantial increases in the size of coefficients on the 
WTO dummy variable in the fixed effects estimates (See Appendix Table A20 column 1 and 
Appendix Table A23 column 1). This shows that without China and Saudi Arabia, the WTO 
accession  process  raised  countries’  economic  policies  and  institutions  substantially  when 
compared to other WTO members who did not go through the accession process.  But more 
importantly,  it  indicates  that,  unsurprisingly,  the  choice  of  indicator  for  the  dependent 
variable, DEI, makes a difference to the value of the estimated parameters. However, the 




To conclude, it is worthwhile to reiterate that we intended to examine the effects of 
WTO accession on domestic economic policies and institutions of newly acceded members in 
comparison to the rest of the developing members in the sample. We argued that measures 
going  beyond  usual  trade  policy  and  trade  outcome  should  be  used  to  explore  the  WTO 
accession benefits for newly acceded countries. The preliminary findings show that given the 
composite measures of domestic economic and institutions, WTO accession had a positive 
and  significant  impact  on  these  newly  acceded  countries  after  controlling  for  developing 
countries in the sample by using difference-in-difference analysis. Hence, the WTO accession 
mechanism could be seen as a package deal that provides opportunities to countries to make 
credible commitments by inducing deeper economic policy changes and making institutions 
respond effectively and efficiently during the process.     
  Future research can be directed  toward quantifying the specific measures of WTO 
accession  package  along  with  their  commitments  on  goods  and  services.  These  measures   - 27 -   
should help to promote a better understanding of the impact of WTO accession in the above 
areas.  It  can  also  be  of  interest  to  determine  the  potentially  differential  impact  of  WTO 
accessions on LDCs, oil-rich countries, and in newly acceded EU countries. Furthermore, 
future analysis can be directed to give focused attention not only to compare and test the 
policy-anchor  hypotheses  of  FTAs,  RTAs,  and  external  sector  related  programmes  of 
international organizations, but also simultaneously to look at the effects, at the national level, 
for each  of these newly  acceded countries so that the country  specific characteristics and 
requirements  are  adequately  recognized.  Transmission  mechanisms  of  the  impacts  of 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1:  Countries completed WTO accessions since 1995 
Country  Application  1st Meeting of 
Working Party (WP) 
Membership  Total Time 
(Application to 
Membership) 
Ecuador  September 1992  July 1993  January 1996  3 years 4 months 
Bulgaria  September 1986  July 1993  December 1996  10 years 3 months 
Mongolia  July 1991  June 1993  January 1997  5 years 6 months 
Panama  August 1991  April 1994  September 1997  5 years 1 month 
Kyrgyz Republic  February 1996  March 1997  December 1998  2 years 10 months 
Latvia  November 1993  March 1995  February 1999  5 years 3 months 
Estonia  March 1994  November 1994  November 1999  5 years 8 months 
Jordan  January 1994  October 1996  April 2000  6 years 4 months 
Georgia  July 1996  March 1998  June 2000  4 years 1 month 
Albania  November 1992  April 1996  September 2000  7 years 10 months 
Oman  April 1996  April 1997  November 2000  4 years 7 months 
Croatia  September 1993  April 1996  November 2001  7 years 2 months 
Lithuania  January 1994  November 1995  May 2001  7 years 5 months 
Moldova  November 1993  June 1997  July 2001  7 years 4 months 
China  July 1986  October 1987  December 2001  15 years 5 months 
Taiwan, Province of 
China 
January 1992  November 1992  January 2002  10 years 
Armenia  November 1993  January 1996  February 2003  9 years 3 months 
Macedonia FYR  December 1994  July 2000  April 2003  8 years 3 months 
Nepal  May 1989  May 2000  April 2004  14 years 11 months 
Cambodia  December 1994  May 2001  October 2004  9 years 10 months 
Saudi Arabia  June 1993 
 
May 1996  December 2005  12 years 7 months 
Viet Nam  January 1995  July 1998  January 2007  12 years 
Kingdom of Tonga  Jun 1995  Apr 2001  July 2007  6 years 3 months 
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Table A2:  Founder member of GATT/WTO 
Country, Year of Membership  Country, Year of Membership  Country, Year of Membership 
Angola    8 April 1994  Grenada    9 February 1994  Pakistan    30 July 1948 
Antigua and Barbuda    30 March 1987  Guatemala    10 October 1991  Papua New Guinea    16 December 1994 
Argentina    11 October 1967  Guinea    8 December 1994  Paraguay    6 January 1994 
Australia    1 January 1948  Guinea Bissau    17 March 1994  Peru    7 October 1951 
Austria    19 October 1951  Guyana    5 July 1966  Philippines    27 December 1979 
Bahrain    13 December 1993  Haiti    1 January 1950  Poland    18 October 1967 
Bangladesh    16 December 1972  Honduras    10 April 1994  Portugal    6 May 1962 
Barbados    15 February 1967  Hong Kong    23 April 1986  Qatar    7 April 1994 
Belgium    1 January 1948  Hungary    9 September 1973  Romania    14 November 1971 
Belize    7 October 1983  Iceland    21 April 1968  Rwanda    1 January 1966 
Benin    12 September 1963  India    8 July 1948  Senegal    27 September 1963 
Bolivia    8 September 1990  Indonesia    24 February 1950  Sierra Leone    19 May 1961 
Botswana    28 August 1987  Ireland    22 December 1967  Singapore    20 August 1973 
Brazil    30 July 1948  Israel    5 July 1962  Slovak Republic    15 April 1993 
Brunei Darussalam    9 December 1993  Italy    30 May 1950  Slovenia    30 October 1994 
Burkina Faso    3 May 1963  Jamaica    31 December 1963  Solomon Islands    28 December 1994 
Burundi    13 March 1965  Japan    10 September 1955  South Africa    13 June 1948 
Cameroon    3 May 1963  Kenya    5 February 1964  Spain    29 August 1963 
Canada    1 January 1948  Korea, Republic of    14 April 1967  Sri Lanka    29 July 1948 
Central African Republic    3 May 1963  Kuwait    3 May 1963  Saint Kitts and Nevis    24 March 1994 
Chad    12 July 1963  Lesotho    8 January 1988  Saint Lucia    13 April 1993 
Chile    16 March 1949  Liechtenstein    29 March 1994  Saint Vincent and the Grenadines    18 May 1993 
 
 
Colombia    3 October 1981 
 
Luxembourg    1 January 1948 
 
Suriname    22 March 1978 
Congo, Republic of    3 May 1963  Macao    11 January 1991  Swaziland, Kingdom of    8 February 1993 
Costa Rica    24 November 1990  Madagascar    30 September 1963  Sweden    30 April 1950 
Côte d'Ivoire    31 December 1963  Malawi    28 August 1964  Switzerland    1 August 1966   - 30 -   
Cuba    1 January 1948  Malaysia    24 October 1957  Tanzania    9 December 1961 
Cyprus    15 July 1963  Maldives    19 April 1983  Thailand    20 November 1982 
Czech Republic    15 April 1993  Mali    11 January 1993  Togo    20 March 1964 
Denmark    28 May 1950  Malta    17 November 1964  Trinidad and Tobago    23 October 1962 
Djibouti    16 December 1994  Mauritania    30 September 1963  Tunisia    29 August 1990 
Dominica    20 April 1993  Mauritius    2 September 1970  Turkey    17 October 1951 
Dominican Republic    19 May 1950  Mexico    24 August 1986  Uganda    23 October 1962 
Egypt    9 May 1970  Morocco    17 June 1987  United Arab Emirates    8 March 1994 
El Salvador    22 May 1991  Mozambique    27 July 1992  United Kingdom    1 January 1948 
Fiji    16 November 1993  Myanmar, Union of    29 July 1948  United States of America    1 January 1948 
Finland    25 May 1950  Namibia    15 September 1992  Uruguay    6 December 1953 
France    1 January 1948  Netherlands    1 January 1948  Venezuela    31 August 1990 
Gabon    3 May 1963  New Zealand    30 July 1948  Yugoslavia    25 August 1966 
The Gambia    22 February 1965  Nicaragua    28 May 1950  Zaire    11 September 1971 
Germany    1 October 1951  Niger    31 December 1963  Zambia    10 February 1982 
Ghana    17 October 1957  Nigeria    18 November 1960  Zimbabwe    11 July 1948 
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Table A3: Ongoing accession countries of WTO (Updated 14 February  2008) 
   Application  Working Party 
Established 
Memorandum  First/Latest* Working Party 
Meeting 
Number of Working 
Party Meetings * 
Draft Working 
Party Report **  
Afghanistan  Nov 2004  Dec 2004               
Algeria  Jun 1987  Jun 1987  Jul 1996  Apr 1998/Feb 2005  8  Feb 2005 
Andorra  Jul 1999   Oct 1997  Mar 1999  Oct 1999  1     
Azerbaijan  Jun 1997  Jul 1997  Apr 1999  Jun 2002/Oct 2004  2    
Bahamas  May 2001  Jul 2001            
Belarus  Sep 1993  Oct 1993  Jan 1996  Jun 1997/Sep 2004  6  Jul 2004 (FS) 
Bhutan  Sep 1999  Oct 1999  Feb 2003  Nov 2004  1    
Bosnia and Herzegovina  May 1999  Jul 1999  Oct 2002  Nov 2004/Dec 2004  2    
Cape Verde  Nov 1999  Jul 2000  Jul 2003  Mar 2004/Dec 2004  2  Oct 2004 (FS) 
Ethiopia  Jan 2003  Feb 2003            
Iran  Jul 1996  May 2005            
Iraq  Sep 2004  Dec 2004            
Kazakhstan  Jan 1996  Feb 1996  Sep 1996  Mar 1997/Nov 2004  7  Sep 2004 (FS) 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 
Jul 1997  Feb 1998  Mar 2001  Oct 2004  1    
Lebanese Republic  Jan 1999  Apr 1999  Jun 2001  Oct 2002/Jul 2004  3  Jun 2004 (FS) 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  Jun 2004  Jul 2004            
Montenegro  Dec 2004  Feb 2005  Mar 2005         
Russian Federation  Jun 1993  Jun 1993  Mar 1994  Jul 1995/Apr 2005  27  Oct 2004 
Samoa  Apr 1998  Jul 1998  Feb 2000  Mar 2002  1  Jun 2003 
Sao Tome and Principe  Jan 2005  May 2005            
Serbia  Dec 2004  Feb 2005  Mar 2005         
Seychelles  May 1995  Jul 1995  Aug 1996  Feb 1997  1  June 1997 
Sudan  Oct 1994  Oct 1994  Jan 1999  Jul 2003/Mar 2004  2  Sep 2004 (FS) 
Tajikistan  May 2001  Jul 2001  Feb 2003  Mar 2004  1  Apr 2005 (FS) 
Ukraine  Nov 1993  Dec 1993  Jul 1994  Feb 1995/Mar 2005  14  Mar 2005 
Uzbekistan  Dec 1994  Dec 1994  Oct 1998  Jul 2002/Jun 2004  2     
Vanuatu  Jul 1995  Jul 1995  Nov 1995  Jul 1996/Oct 1999  2  Accession Package 
Oct 2001 
Yemen  Apr 2000  Jul 2000  Nov 2002  Nov 2004  1    
Note: * As of the date of this document.  
           ** Most recent Factual Summary (FS), draft Working Party Report or Elements of draft Working Party Report 
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Table A 4: Freedom House Index of Economic Freedom (EFI) 
Index of Economic Freedom 
(EFI) 
Economic freedom is defined as the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption 
of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself. In other words, people are free 
to work, produce, consume, and invest in the ways they feel are most productive. To measure economic freedom and rate each 
country, the authors of the Index study 50 independent economic variables. These variables fall into 10 broad categories, or 
factors, of economic freedom. In the Index of Economic Freedom, all 0 factors are equally important to the level of economic 
freedom in any country. Thus, to determine a country’s overall score, the factors are weighted equally. The scales run from 1 to 5: 
score of signifies an economic environment or set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of 5 




Trade policy is a key factor in measuring economic freedom. The degree to which government hinders access to and the free flow 
of foreign commerce can have a direct bearing on the ability of individuals to pursue their economic goals. The factors are: 
Weighted average tariff rate, Non-tariff barriers, Corruption in the customs service. 




To measure the fiscal burden a government imposes on its citizens, the authors examined both marginal tax rates and the year-to-
year change in the level of government expenditures as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The factors are: Top marginal 
income tax rate, Top marginal corporate tax rate, Year-to-year change in government expenditures, as a percent of GDP. 





This factor measures government’s direct use of scarce resources for its own purposes and government’s control over resources 
through  ownership.  The  measure  comprises  both  government  consumption  and  government  production.  The  factors  are 
Government  consumption  as  a  percentage  of  the  economy,  Government  ownership  of  businesses  and  industries,  Share  of 
government revenues from state-owned enterprises and government ownership of property, Economic output produced by the 
government.  




The value of a country’s currency is shaped largely by its monetary policy. With a stable monetary policy, people can rely on 
market  prices  for  the  foreseeable  future.  Hence,  investment,  savings,  and  other  longer-term  plans  are  easier  to  make,  and 
individuals enjoy greater economic freedom. The factors are: Weighted average inflation rate from 1995 to 2004. 






Restrictions  on  foreign  investment  limit  the  inflow  of  capital  and  thus  hamper  economic  freedom.  By  contrast,  little  or  no 
restriction of foreign investment enhances economic freedom because foreign investment provides funds for economic expansion. 
For this factor, the more restrictions a country imposes on foreign investment, the lower its level of economic freedom and the 
higher its score. The factors are: Foreign investment code, Restrictions on foreign ownership of business, Restrictions on industries 
and companies open to foreign investors, Restrictions and performance requirements on foreign companies, Foreign ownership of 
land, Equal treatment under the law for both foreign and domestic companies, Restrictions on repatriation of earnings, Restrictions 
on capital transactions, Availability of local financing for foreign companies 
(BK) Banking 
 
In  most  countries,  banks  provide  the  essential  financial  services  that  facilitate  economic  growth;  they  lend  money  to  start 







which individuals can store their earnings. The more banks are controlled by the government, the less free they are to engage in 
these  activities.  Hence,  heavy  bank  regulation  reduces  opportunities  and  restricts  economic  freedom;  therefore,  the  more  a 
government  restricts  its  banking  sector,  the  lower  its  level  of  economic  freedom  and  the  higher  its  score.  The  factors  are: 
Government ownership of financial institutions, Restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and subsidiaries, 
Government influence over the allocation of credit , Government regulations that inhibit financial activity, Freedom to offer all 
types of financial services, securities, and insurance policies. 






In a free-market economy, prices allocate resources to their highest use. A firm that needs more employees may signal this need to 
the market by offering a higher wage; an individual who greatly values a home on the market offers a higher price to purchase it. 
Prices also act as signals to producers and consumers by conveying information that it otherwise would be prohibitively costly to 
obtain. The factors are: Minimum wage laws, Freedom to set prices privately without government influence, Government price 
controls, Extent to which government price controls are used, Government subsidies to businesses that affect prices. 









The ability to accumulate private property is the main motivating force in a market economy, and the rule of law is vital to a fully 
functioning free market economy. Secure property rights give citizens the confidence to undertake commercial activities, save 
their income, and make long-term plans because they know that their income and savings are safe from expropriation. This factor 
examines the extent to which the government protects private property by enforcing the laws and how safe private property is from 
expropriation. The less protection private property receives, the lower a country’s level of economic freedom and the higher its 
score.  The  factors  are:  Freedom  from  government  influence  over  the  judicial  system,  Commercial  code  defining  contracts, 
Sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes,  Government expropriation of property, Corruption within the judiciary, 








Regulations and restrictions are in effect a form of taxation that makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to create and/or maintain new 
businesses. In some countries, government officials frown on any private-sector initiatives; in a few, they even make them illegal. 
Although many regulations hinder businesses, the most important are associated with licensing new companies and businesses. 
The  factors  are:  Licensing  requirements  to  operate  a  business,  Ease  of  obtaining  a  business  license,  Corruption  within  the 
bureaucracy;  Labor regulations, such as established  workweeks, paid vacations, and parental leave, as well as selected labor 
regulations; Environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations; Regulations that impose a burden on business. 






Informal markets are the direct result of some kind of government intervention in the marketplace. An informal market activity is 
one that the government has taxed heavily, regulated in a burdensome manner, or simply outlawed in the past. This factor captures 
the effects of government interventions that are not always fully measured elsewhere. The factors are: Smuggling, Piracy of 
intellectual property in the informal market, Agricultural production supplied on the informal market, Manufacturing supplied on 
the informal market, Services supplied on the informal market, transportation supplied on the informal market, Labor supplied on 
the informal market.  
Source: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdfs/Index2006_Chap5.pdf   - 34 -   
 
Table A 5: PRS Group-International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)  
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, 
financial, and economic. A separate index is created for each of the subcategories. The Political Risk index is based on 
100 points, Financial Risk on 50 points, and Economic Risk on 50 points. The total points from the three indices are 
divided by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk score. The composite scores, ranging 
from zero to 100, are then broken into categories from Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) to Very High Risk (zero to 
49.5 points).The ICRG staff collects political information and financial and economic data, converting these into risk 
points  for  each  individual  risk  component  on  the  basis  of  a  consistent  pattern  of  evaluation.  The  political  risk 
assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available information, while the financial and economic 
risk assessments are made solely on the basis of objective data. In addition to the 22 individual ratings, the ICRG model 
also produces a rating for each of the three risk factor groups plus an overall score for each country. 
Investment profile (IP):  
 
This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and 
financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to 
Very High Risk. The subcomponents are:  Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and Payment Delays. 
Law and Order (LO): 
 
Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-
component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an 
assessment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can enjoy a high rating – 3 – in terms of its judicial 
system, but a low rating - 1 – if it suffers from a very high crime rate of if the law is routinely ignored without effective 
sanction (for example, widespread illegal strikes). 
Bureaucratic Quality (BQ): 
       
The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of 
policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength 
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk 
countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established 
mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low 
points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day 
administrative functions. 
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Table A6: List of countries in sample for empirical analysis  
Country  Country  Country  Country 
Angola
1   Djibouti
1   Lithuania   Papua New Guinea
1  
Albania   Dominican Republic   Latvia   Poland  
Argentina   Ecuador   Morocco   Paraguay  
Armenia   Egypt, Arab Rep.  Moldova   Romania  
Burundi   Estonia   Madagascar   Rwanda  
Benin   Gabon   Mexico   Saudi Arabia 
Burkina Faso   Georgia   Macedonia, FYR  Senegal  
Bangladesh   Ghana   Mali
1   El Salvador  
Bulgaria   Guinea
1   Myanmar   Suriname  
Bahrain
1  Guinea-Bissau
1   Mongolia   Slovak Republic  
Belize   Guatemala   Mozambique
1   Swaziland
1  
Bolivia   Guyana   Mauritania   Chad  
Brazil   Honduras   Mauritius   Togo  
Barbados   Croatia   Malawi   Thailand  
Botswana   Hungary   Malaysia   Trinidad and Tobago  
Central African Republic   Indonesia  Namibia
1   Tunisia  
Chile   India   Niger   Turkey  
China   Jamaica   Nigeria   Tanzania  
Cote d'Ivoire   Jordan   Nicaragua   Uganda  
Cameroon   Kenya   Nepal   Uruguay 
Congo, Rep.  Kyrgyz Republic   Oman   Venezuela, RB 
Colombia   Cambodia   Pakistan   South Africa  
Costa Rica   Korea, Rep.  Panama   Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Cuba   Sri Lanka   Peru   Zambia  
Czech Republic  Lesotho   Philippines   Zimbabwe  
Note: Countries in BOLD are not in ICRG database. 
1 GATT Article XXVI: 5(c ) countries in sample   
Source: Heritage  Foundation for Index Economic  Freedom, and PRS-Group for International Country  Risk 
Guide database.  
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Table A7: Population, GDP per capita and Trade/GDP of 23 newly acceded WTO members 
 







  2005  2005  1995  2005 
Ecuador  13  2739.9  54  63 
Bulgaria  7.8  3442.5  91  138 
Mongolia  2.5  736.3  97.2  160 
Panama  3.2  4786.3  198.8  141 
Kyrgyz Republic  5.1  473.4  71.8  97 
Latvia  2.3  6856.7  87.5  111 
Estonia  1.3  9744.6  144.5  175 
Jordan  5.4  2376.7  124.6  145 
Georgia  4.5  1429.2  67.8  97 
Albania  3.1  2677.4  47  68 
Oman  2.5  9460.1  79.6  99.7 
Croatia  4.4  8417.7  88.1  103 
Lithuania  3.4  7465.5  111  124 
Moldova  4.2  691.0  107.3  144 
China  1296.2  1708.6  43.9  69 
Taiwan, Province of China  22.6  15291.5  N.A.  120.2 
Armenia  3  1625.4  86.1  67 
Macedonia, FYR  2  2832.8  75.8  108 
Nepal  26.6  270.7  59.5  49 
Cambodia  13.8  383.1  77.7  139 
Saudi Arabia  24  12606.4  65.4  87 
Viet Nam  82.2  631.7  74.7  145 
Kingdom of Tonga  0.102  2159.0  52.0  54.0 
Note: N.A.: Not available 
Source: UNCTAD database, WTO 2007 database, and World Bank 2007 database.  
 
 
Table A8: MFN Tariff Rates (simple average) of 23 newly acceded WTO members 
Country   Base year  Latest year  Change  Rank 
Ecuador  12.9  11.7  -1.2  15 
Bulgaria  12.3  10.4  -1.9  13 
Mongolia  N.A.  4.5     
Panama  12.2  7.3  -4.9  7 
Kyrgyz Republic  8.5  4.8  -3.7  8 
Latvia  3.8  5.4  1.6  19 
Estonia  1.6  5.4  3.8  21 
Jordan  22.1  11.5  -10.6  2 
Georgia  10.6  7.0  -3.6  9 
Albania  15.9  5.7  -10.2  3 
Oman  7.7  5.3  -2.4  11 
Croatia  10.6  4.9  -5.7  6 
Lithuania  3.5  5.4  1.9  20 
Moldova  5.9  5.2  -0.7  16 
China  35.5  9.9  -25.6  1 
Taiwan, Province of China  8.3  6.4  -1.9  13 
Armenia  2.9  3.0  0.1  17 
Macedonia FYR  14.4  7.9  -6.5  5 
Nepal  16.6  13.9  -2.7  10   - 37 -   
          Cambodia  16.4  14.3  -2.1  12 
          Saudi Arabia  12.1  5.2  -6.9  4 
          Viet Nam  16.5  16.8  0.3  18 
          Kingdom of Tonga  N.A.  16.8  N.A.  N.A. 
Note: N.A.: Not available, Base year is the year of 1st Working Party meeting. Due to data availability, some 
countries may not match with exact year. Rank 1 implies maximum decline in tariff rate.  
Source: UNCTAD TRIANS database.  
 
 
Table A9: Shares of merchandise exports and imports of 23 newly acceded WTO members 
(% of the world) 




  1995  2005  1995  2005 
Ecuador  0.083  0.096  0.079  0.096 
Bulgaria  0.104  0.112  0.108  0.169 
Mongolia  0.009  0.010  0.008  0.011 
Panama  0.012  0.010  0.048  0.039 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.008  0.006  0.010  0.010 
Latvia  0.025  0.049  0.035  0.080 
Estonia  0.036  0.074  0.046  0.095 
Jordan  0.034  0.041  0.071  0.098 
Georgia  0.003  0.008  0.007  0.023 
Albania  0.004  0.006  0.014  0.024 
Oman  0.117  0.179  0.081  0.082 
Croatia  0.087  0.084  0.141  0.172 
Lithuania  0.052  0.113  0.070  0.144 
Moldova  0.014  0.010  0.016  0.021 
China  2.877  7.280  2.526  6.131 
Taiwan, Province of China  2.157  1.890  1.983  1.696 
Armenia  0.005  0.009  0.013  0.016 
Macedonia FYR  0.023  0.020  0.033  0.030 
Nepal  0.007  0.008  0.025  0.017 
Cambodia  0.017  0.028  0.023  0.036 
Saudi Arabia  0.968  1.725  0.537  0.552 
Viet Nam  0.105  0.310  0.156  0.344 
Kingdom of Tonga  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008 (updated January 2008) 
 
   Table A10: Descriptive statistics of 23 newly acceded WTO member states  
  Year  # Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
GDP per capita(current $US)  2005  23  4295.93  4283.04  270.70  15291.50 
1995  23  86.60  35.41  43.90  198.80  Trade/GDP ratio 
2005  23  109.28  36.83  49.00  175.00 
1995  23  11.92  7.59  1.60  35.50  MFN Tariff Rates 
  2005  23  8.20  4.12  3.00  16.80 
1995  23  0.29  0.74  0.00  2.88  Shares of merchandise exports  
(% of World)  2005  23  0.52  1.56  0.00  7.28 
1995  23  0.26  0.64  0.00  2.53  Shares of merchandise imports 
(% of World)  2005  23  0.43  1.29  0.00  6.13 
Note: Author’s calculation 
Source: UNCTAD and World Bank 
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Table A11:  List of commitments (areas and paragraphs), working party meetings and 
number of members  










# Working Party 
Members 
Ecuador   17  21  9  21 
Macedonia, FYR  19  24  5  23 
Panama   19  24  5  34 
Mongolia   20  17  5  17 
Latvia   20  22  6  24 
Nepal   20  25  3  23 
Estonia   21  24  8  21 
Kyrgyz Republic   21  29  6  15 
Bulgaria   22  26  9  22 
Croatia   22  27  6  19 
Lithuania   22  28  5  27 
Albania   22  29  9  16 
Georgia   23  29  3  21 
Jordan   23  29  5  32 
Taiwan, Province 
of China  23 
63 
11  48 
Oman   24  26  6  31 
Moldova   24  28  5  25 
Cambodia   24  29  5  15 
Armenia   25  39  5  30 
Saudi Arabia   26  59  12  57 
China   27  82  41  62 
Tonga   29  32  3  13 
Viet Nam   30  70  14  43 
Mean   23  34  8  28 
Median  22  28  6  23 
Std. Dev  3.18  17.13  7.73  13.24 
Min  17 (Ecuador)  
 
 






Max  30 (Viet Nam)   82 (China)  41 (China)   62 (China)  
Note: Author’s calculation. Ascending order of # areas of commitments in WPRs  










Panel   Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
Developing country GATT 
members  80  744  1.73  0.58  0.00  3.25 
WTO members  20  181  1.85  0.48  0.90  3.32 
WTO members-GATT  
Article XXVI5(c )  9  76  1.71  0.71  0.50  3.25 
Notes: Economic Freedom Index includes 10 indicators: trade, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary 
policy, foreign investment, banking, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, informal market. The higher 
score implies higher economic freedom.  
Source:  Economic  Freedom  Index  is  from  Heritage  Foundation  and  WTO  accession  year  is  from  WTO 
accession documents.   - 39 -   





Panel   Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
Developing country GATT 
members  68  680  4.163  1.026  0.666  6.666 
WTO members  14  122  4.573  0.891  2.611  6.166 
WTO members- GATT Article 
XXVI5(c )  8  80  3.908  1.127  2.000  6.166 
Notes: The ICRG index includes 3 indicators: Investment profile, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. 
The higher score implies less risk.  





Table A14: Correlation among Economic Freedom Index (EFI) indicators 
  EFI  TD  FB  GI  MP  FI  BK  WP  PR  RE  IM 
EFI  1                     
TD  0.593  1                   
FB  0.448  0.333  1                 
GI  0.443  0.257  0.130  1               
MP  0.421  -0.010  0.069*  0.011  1             
FI  0.693  0.381  0.226  0.294  0.094  1           
BK  0.757  0.407  0.291  0.305  0.189  0.607  1         
WP  0.688  0.273  0.237  0.320  0.188  0.545  0.566  1       
PR  0.717  0.348  0.198  0.136  0.143  0.483  0.497  0.417  1     
RE  0.741  0.361  0.214  0.145  0.209  0.504  0.514  0.492  0.698  1   
IM  0.700  0.297  0.241  0.142  0.230  0.355  0.439  0.409  0.651  0.604  1 
Note: *statistically significant at 5%-level, and all other coefficients are statistically at significant at 1%-level, 
underline implies coefficient is not significant. 
Sample consists of Developing country GATT/WTO members 




Table A15: Correlation of GDP per capita with Economic Freedom Index (EFI) indicators 
   GDPpc 
(EFI) Economic Freedom Index  0.657 
(TD) Trade  0.355 
(FB) Fiscal Burden  0.301 
(GI) Government intervention  0.168 
(MP) Monetary Policy  0.174 
(FI) Foreign investment  0.431 
(BK) Banking  0.468 
(WP)  Wages and prices  0.360 
(PR) Property Rights  0.564 
(RE) Regulation  0.629 
(IM) Informal market  0.572 
Note: All the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%-level.  
GDP is in PPP (constant 2000 international $) value. Acronyms are in parentheses.  
Sample consists of Developing country GATT/WTO members 
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Table A16 Correlation among International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Indicators 
  ICRGI  IP  BQ 
International Country Risk Guide  Index (ICRGI)  1       
(IP) Investment Profile   0.859  1     
(LO) Law and Order  0.623  0.219  1   
(BQ) Bureaucratic Quality  0.590  0.285  0.310  1 
Note: All the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%-level.  
Sample consists of Developing country GATT/WTO members 




Table A17: Correlation of GDP per capita with ICRG Index indicators 
   GDPpc 
International Country Risk Guide  Index (ICRGI)  0.548 
(IP) Investment Profile   0.365 
(LO) Law and Order  0.366 
(BQ) Bureaucratic Quality  0.561 
Note: All the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%-level.  
Sample consists of Developing country GATT/WTO members 
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   Table A18: OLS estimation- WTO accession impact on domestic economic policy and institution  
  Dependent variable: Economic Freedom Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
WTO accession year(t)  0.138*  0.104  0.103       
  (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.094)       
WTO accession year (t0)        0.046  0.041  0.031 
        (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.088) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)        0.134**  0.132*  0.123* 
        (0.097)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
log(Real GDP per capita)t-1  0.282***  0.282***  0.282***  0.189***  0.292***  0.282*** 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.029) 
Country effects  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Year effects  N  N  Y  N  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  Y  N  Y  Y 
Constant  -0.232  -0.403  -0.381*  -0.300  -0.400**  -0.380** 
   (0.205)  (0.209)  (0.214)  (0.210)  (0.209)  (0.210) 
#Observations  906  906  906  906  906  906 
#Countries  98  98  98  98  98  98 
R-squared  0.439  0.450  0.415  0.442  0.450  0.451 
F-statistics  51.03  37.81  12.67  35.19  29.05  13.64 
Notes: Economic Freedom Index includes 10 indicators: trade, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, foreign  
investment, banking, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, informal market. The higher score implies higher economic freedom  
Treatment Group: The WTO accession countries.  
WTO membership year (t): Country gets 1 if becomes WTO member, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample time points.  
WTO accession year (t0): It takes 1 for WTO accession year, and rest of the time points is zero.   
WTO accession year after (t0+t*): It takes 1 for the year after WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample points.  
Control Group: Developing country GATT members 
Robust standard errors are (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering in all country. *** implies significance at the 1 percent level; 
** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level.  
Source: Economic Freedom Index is from Heritage Foundation, WTO accession year is from WTO accession documents; 
 log (Real GDP per capita) from the World Bank. 
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Table A19: FGLS estimation-WTO accession impact on domestic economic policy and institution  
  Dependent variable: Economic Freedom Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
WTO accession year(t)  0.124***  0.094***  0.091***       
  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.041)       
WTO accession year (t0)        0.091***  0.071**  0.079** 
        (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)        0.189***  0.149***  0.141*** 
        (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
log(Real GDP per capita) t-1  0.281***  0.281***  0.284***  0.287***  0.281***  0.282*** 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Country effects  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Year effects  N  N  Y  N  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  Y  N  Y  Y 
Constant  -0.250***  -0.416***  -0.432***  -0.303***  -0.408***  -0.425*** 
   (0.131)  (0.124)  (0.131)  (0.130)  (0.124)  (0.124) 
#Observations  906  906  906  906  906  906 
#Countries  98  98  98  98  98  98 
AR(1)   -0.805  -0.782  -0.780  -0.802  -0.780  -0.778 
Log likelihood  272.7  265.3  266.8  273.1  265.0  266.7 
Wald Statistics  269.7  332.3  343.8  278.6  337.9  349.8 
Notes: Economic Freedom Index includes 10 indicators: trade, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, foreign  
investment, banking, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, informal market. The higher score implies higher economic freedom  
Treatment Group: The WTO accession countries.  
WTO membership year (t): Country gets 1 if becomes WTO member, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample time points.  
WTO accession year (t0): It takes 1 for WTO accession year, and rest of the time points is zero.   
WTO accession year after (t0+t*): It takes 1 for the year after WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample points.  
Control Group: Developing country GATT members 
GLS model uses linear panel model using feasible generalized least squares. The model specification permits AR(1) correlation over time,  
and  specifies each group to have a different AR(1) process for different cross-section units. Standard errors are (in parentheses)  
 Z-statistics *** implies significance at the 1 percent level;** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level.  
Source: Economic Freedom Index is from Heritage Foundation, WTO accession year is from WTO accession documents;  
log (Real GDP per capita) from the World Bank. 
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     Table A20: Fixed effects estimation-WTO accession impact on domestic economic policy and institution  
  Dependent variable: Economic Freedom Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
WTO accession year(t)  0.117***  0.119**  0.111***       
  (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.050)       
WTO accession year (t0)        0.064*  0.067  0.061 
        (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)        0.133***  0.131***  0.134*** 
        (0.054)  (0.057)  (0.059) 
log(Real GDP per capita) t-1  1.056***  0.990***  1.055***  1.027***  0.970***  0.980*** 
  (0.183)  (0.224)  (0.222)  (0.186)  (0.227)  (0.224) 
Country effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  Y  N  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  Y  N  Y  Y 
Constant  -6.328***  -4.936***  -4.372***  -6.194***  -4.864***  -4.869*** 
   (1.293)  (1.560)  (1.545)  (1.314)  (1.527)  (1.626) 
#Observations  906  906  906  906  906  906 
#Countries  98  98  98  98  98  98 
Breusch-Pagan LM test 
2 c (1)  1937.32***           
Hausman Specification Test 
2 c (2)  16.42***           
R-squared  0.435  0.439  0.439  0.435  0.407  0.439 
F-statistics  35.73  23.51  9.16  24.94  17.99  8.65 
Notes: Economic Freedom Index includes 10 indicators: trade, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary policy, foreign  
investment, banking, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, informal market. The higher score implies higher economic freedom. 
Breusch-Pagan LM statistic tests the random effect model versus the pooling OLS. Hausman specification statistic tests the fixed-effect  
model versus the random effect model.  WTO membership year (t): Country gets 1 if becomes WTO member, and continues to be 1  
for the rest of the sample time points.  
WTO accession year (t0): It takes 1 for WTO accession year, and rest of the time points is zero. WTO accession year after (t0+t*):  
It takes 1 for the year after WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample points 
Treatment Group: The WTO accession countries. Control Group: Developing country GATT members 
Robust standard errors are (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering in all country. *** implies significance at the 1 percent level; 
** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level.  
Source: Economic Freedom Index is from Heritage Foundation, WTO accession year is from WTO accession documents;  
log (Real GDP per capita) from the World Bank.   - 44 -   
Table A21: OLS estimation-Robustness analysis:  WTO accession impact on domestic economic policy and institution  
  Dependent variable: ICRG Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
WTO accession year(t)  0.385**  0.330*  0.340*       
  (0.198)  (0.202)  (0.203)       
WTO accession year (t0)        -0.060  -0.057  -0.026 
        (0.175)  (0.179)  (0.159) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)        0.495**  0.434*  0.429* 
        (0.221)  (0.227)  (0.231) 
log(Real GDP per capita) t-1  0.461***  0.462***  0.461***  0.461***  0.461***  0.453*** 
  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
Country effects  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Year effects  N  N  Y  N  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  Y  N  Y  Y 
Constant  0.943**  0.433  0.118  0.945**  0.455  0.128 
   (0.496)  (0.504)  (0.496)  (0.493)  (0.505  (0.497) 
#Observations  782  782  782  782  782  782 
#Countries  80  80  80  80  80  80 
R-squared  0.315  0.334  0.359  0.319  0.337  0.362 
F-statistics  28.54  28.1  26.64  19.73  21.36  25.36 
Notes: The ICRG index includes 3 indicators: Investment profile, law and order, and bureaucratic quality.  
The higher score implies less risk. Treatment Group: The WTO accession countries.  
WTO membership year (t): Country gets 1 if becomes WTO member, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample time points.  
WTO accession year (t0): It takes 1 for WTO accession year, and rest of the time points is zero.   
WTO accession year after (t0+t*): It takes 1 for the year after WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample points.  
Control Group: Developing country GATT members 
Robust standard errors are (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering in all country. *** implies significance at the 1 percent level; 
** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level.  
Source: ICRG Index is from PRS Group ICRG database, WTO accession year is from WTO accession documents; 
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     Table A22: FGLS estimation-Robustness analysis: WTO accession impact on domestic economic policy and institution  
  Dependent variable: ICRG Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
WTO accession year(t)  0.237*  0.142  0.115       
  (0.113)  (0.112)  (0.106)       
WTO accession year (t0)        0.039  -0.015  -0.031 
        (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.108) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)        0.563***  0.440***  0.403*** 
        (0.140)  (0.142)  (0.135) 
log(Real GDP per capita) t-1  0.482***  0.472***  0.470***  0.473***  0.463***  0.465*** 
  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.045)  
Country effects  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Year effects  N  N  Y  N  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  Y  N  Y  Y 
Constant  0.640**  0.004  -0.166  0.659**  0.075  -0.095 
   (0.329)  (0.338)  (0.339)  (0.334)  (0.344)  (0.343) 
#Observations  782  782  782  782  782  782 
#Countries  80  80  80  80  80  80 
AR(1)  -0.781  -0.778  -0.806  -0.791  -0.788  -0.811 
Log likelihood  -468.964  -4534  -388.30  -454.5  -441.5  -378.4 
Wald Statistics  123.960  16658  28684  143.84  178.08  303.84 
Notes: The ICRG index includes 3 indicators: Investment profile, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. The higher score implies less risk.  
Treatment Group: The WTO accession countries.  
WTO membership year (t): Country gets 1 if becomes WTO member, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample time points.  
WTO accession year (t0): It takes 1 for WTO accession year, and rest of the time points is zero.   
WTO accession year after (t0+t*): It takes 1 for the year after WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample points.  
Control Group: Developing country GATT members 
GLS model uses linear panel model using feasible generalized least squares. The model specification permits AR(1) correlation over time, and  
 specifies each group to have a different AR(1) process for different cross-section units. Standard errors are (in parentheses)   
Z-statistics *** implies significance at the 1 percent level;** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level.  
Source: ICRG Index is from PRS Group ICRG database, WTO accession year is from WTO accession documents;  
log (Real GDP per capita) from the World Bank. 
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      Table A23: Fixed effects estimation-Robustness analysis: WTO accession impact on domestic economic policy and institution  
  Dependent variable: ICRG Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
WTO accession year(t)  0.318  0.367*  0.362*       
  (0.213)  (0.201)  (0.195)       
WTO accession year (t0)        0.058  0.051  0.078 
        (0.215)  (0.211)  (0.187) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)        0.513**  0.502**  0.483** 
        (0.214)  (0.203)  (0.203) 
log(Real GDP per capita) t-1  2.123***  1.931***  1.799  2.043***  1.872***  1.703*** 
  (0.459)  (0.578)  (0.574)  (0.460)  (0.576)  (0.572) 
Country effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  Y  N  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  Y  N  Y  Y 




12.862***  -12.879 
   (3.269)  (4.012)  (3.987)  (3.273)  (3.997)  (3.973) 
#Observations  782  782  782  782  782  782 
#Countries  80  80  80  80  80  80 
Breusch-Pagan LM test 
2 c (1)  1210.021***           
Hausman Specification Test 
2 c (2)  27.84***           
R-squared  0.303  0.308  0.317  0.305  0.310  0.319 
F-statistics  21.45  23.52  21.06  22.19  22.42  23.39 
Notes: The ICRG index includes 3 indicators: Investment profile, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. The higher score implies less risk. 
Breusch-Pagan LM statistic tests the random effect model versus the pooling OLS. Hausman specification statistic tests the fixed-effect  
model versus the random effect model.    
Treatment Group: The WTO accession countries.  
WTO membership year (t): Country gets 1 if becomes WTO member, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample time points.  
WTO accession year (t0): It takes 1 for WTO accession year, and rest of the time points is zero.   
WTO accession year after (t0+t*): It takes 1 for the year after WTO accession, and continues to be 1 for the rest of the sample points.  
Control Group: Developing country GATT members. Robust standard errors are (in parentheses) adjusted for clustering in all country.  
*** implies significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level.  
Source: ICRG Index is from PRS Group ICRG database, WTO accession year is from WTO accession documents;  
log (Real GDP per capita) from the World Bank.   - 47 -   
    Table A24: Fixed effects-Robustness analysis: WTO accession impact, dropping outlier countries  
  Dependent variable: Economic Freedom Index  Dependent variable: ICRG Index 
   Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6  Col.7  Col.8 
WTO accession year(t)  0. 147***  0.139***      0. 512 **  0. 523***     
  (0.043)  (0.047)      (0.195)  (0. 170)     
WTO accession year (t0)      0.063**  0.084**      0. 190  0. 222** 
      (0.036)  (0.038)      (0.213)  (0.168) 
WTO accession year after (t0+t*)      0.131**  0.152***      0. 661***  0. 643*** 
      (0.052)  (0.057)      (0.195)  (0.057) 
log(Real GDP per capita) t-1  1.098***  1.053***  1.028***  1.037***  2.022***  2.051***  2.209***  1.921*** 
  (0.173)  (0.233)  (1.324)  (0.237)  (0. 463)  (0. 579)  (4.664)  (0.577) 
Country effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Time trend  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y 
Constant  -6.609***  -5.206***  -6.478***  -5.119***  -17.497***  -15.194***  -16.910  -14.818*** 
   (1.269)  (1.627)  (1.324)  (1.654)  (3.291)  (4.006)  (3.308)  (3.995) 
Outlier countries  China and Saudi Arabia 
#Observations  887  887  887  887  762  762  762  762 
#Countries  96  96  96  96  78  78  78  78 
R-squared  0.445  0.446  0.443  0.447  0.303  0.316  0.305  0.317 
F-statistics  49.24  11.24  32.55  10.24  27.20  23.28  27.37  24.26 
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